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Abstract 
 
A few studies lately explored the relationship between changes in the demographic 
structure and inflation using mainly cross-country analyses. In this paper we investigate how the 
evolution in the age structure of the population affected price dynamics in Italy, using annual data 
for a panel of provinces in the period 1982-2016. The within-country approach allows us to wipe 
out the effects of supranational shocks, as well as to better take into account the effects of 
monetary policy, main common driver of price dynamics over the medium-term. We use a set of 
indicators, namely young age, old age and overall dependency ratios, and the share of working 
age population. Our results suggest that the ongoing ageing process likely contributed to 
dampening price dynamics. 
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1. Introduction2 
From Italy’s Unification in 1861 to today, the population living in Italy has more than 
doubled, from about 26 to 60.5 million at the beginning of 2018. At the same time, along the 
twentieth century, Italy moved along the path – typical of a country that experiences modern 
economic growth – of the "demographic transition", with a gradual decline in mortality rates 
followed by the reduction in birth rates. Progresses in average life expectancy have been 
enormous and will continue in the future: the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) estimates 
that in 2065 life expectancy at birth will be 90.2 years for women and 86.1 for men (it was 84.9 
years for women and 80.6 for men in 2017). Nonetheless, the Italian population is estimated to 
shrink back to 1970 levels in 2065, at 53.7 million.  
The reduction in birth and mortality rates affected the age structure of the population, 
determining a gradual ageing. Since the mid-eighties of the XX century, Italy and many other 
industrialized countries, entered a new phase of its demographic history, a history that will 
undergo further changes in the next fifty years. Fertility and mortality rates have stabilized at low 
levels; ageing indexes are increasing, especially since the last decade of the twentieth century; the 
share of the working age population is shrinking and the index of structural dependency is 
growing (population 0-14 and >64 years, over working age population, 15-64). The contribution 
of demography to economic growth turned negative in the 1990s. The demographic dividend – 
the economic growth that, from an accounting point of view, can derive from an increase in the 
share of working age population – has become or will become negative for all industrialized 
countries in the next future (Barbiellini Amidei, Gomellini and Piselli 2018). 
Demographic changes, indeed, affect many economic aspects, often with offsetting effects. 
Ageing directly alters the size of the labor force, with important impacts on production, 
consumption and saving decisions, productivity and other related variables.  
The revived debate on secular stagnation (Hansen 1939; Summers 2014) lately emphasized 
that population dynamics and age structure can produce a non-negligible impact on economic 
growth through changes in savings preferences. All this would have significant consequences on 
the one hand on real interest rates, on investments and on aggregate demand (Favero and Galasso 
2 We would like to thank Paolo Croce, Giuseppe Ferrero, Gloria De Martinis, Federico Polidoro, Paolo Sestito, 
Antonella Simone, Elod Takàts for suggestions, data provided and comments on previous versions of the work; 
Giuliana Ferretti for excellent and generous research assistance. We would also like to thank the participants in the 
Session Demography and Economic Change from Modern Era to Date: An International Comparative Perspective – 
XVIII World Economic History Conference, Boston, 3 August 2018, in particular the discussant Francesco 
Cinnirella; participants in the Sixth CEPR Economic History Symposium, Rome, 23 June 2018, in particular Stephen 
Broadberry. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of 
Italy; all errors are our own.  
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2015; Carvalho, Ferrero and Nechio 2016; Summers 2016); on the other hand (supply), on the 
pace of innovation and productivity (Gordon 2015). The contribution to the economic growth of 
the change in age composition of the population can thus be significant. Countries whose 
population shows, for example, a growing share of young people have the potential to collect a 
dividend from demographic change through an increase in the supply of labor in quantity and 
quality. The increase of the young in the working age population, also affect the age composition 
of employment (Feyrer 2007) producing – in addition to the direct effects on economic growth 
that emerge in a growth accounting scheme (via increases in employment rates and - levels of 
efficiency) – effects on the dynamics of productivity, first of all through the impact on innovation 
and entrepreneurship (Fürnkranz-Prskawetz 2015; Ciccarelli, Gomellini, Sestito 2018).  
It is much less investigated which, if any, is the long run impact of demography on price 
dynamics. Using the words of Kim, Lee and Yoon (2014, p.19), “it is hard to tell from the 
theoretical perspective how various changes in demographics affects inflation and it would 
ultimately be an empirical issue”. If the theory suggests that over the long run inflation is a 
monetary phenomenon, “demographic trends are among the forces that shape the economic 
environment in which monetary policy operates” (Bobeica et al, 2017).  
Recently some studies explored the connection between changes in the demographic structure 
and price dynamics using cross-country analysis (e.g. Juselius and Takáts 2015, 2016, 2018; 
Bobeica et al. 2017), with the aim of investigating whether and how much demography 
contributes to the present subdued price dynamics. Although generally referring to theoretical 
hypotheses on the link between population ageing and inflation (theories on life-cycle 
consumption and savings, secular stagnation, political economy approach: cfr. infra, par.3), these 
papers perform reduced-form analysis and do not identify which channels underlie the 
transmission of demographic effects on price dynamics. 
In the same vein, in our paper we make a reduced-form analysis of the relationship between 
the demographic structure and price dynamics in a single country, Italy, using a historical and 
spatial perspective (similar to Liu and Westelius 2016). We use data at the provincial level and 
exploit the territorial and historical variability to identify if and how demography affected price 
changes in the period 1982-2016. By examining the issue within a single country (rather than 
across countries), we can purge more effectively from the effect of monetary policy as the main 
determinant of price dynamics over the medium term, as well as the effect of supranational 
shocks which may have a more homogeneous impact in a single country in respect to the cross-
country case (e.g. Broniatowska 2017).  
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The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, in section 2 we trace a long run 
picture of demographic changes and inflation dynamics since 1900, showing Italy in international 
comparison. The third section reviews the extant literature which is empirical and focus mainly 
on the estimation of the demography-inflation relationship. In the fourth section we describe the 
data and the econometric specification and methodologies we use. In section 5 - estimation 
results are presented. Some conclusions close the paper.             
 
2. Demographic change and inflation dynamics: Italy in international comparison, 
1900-2016  
From Italy’s Unification in 1861 to date, population living in Italy more than doubled, from 26 
to 60.5 million. Nonetheless, the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) estimates that the 
population in Italy should reach 53.7 million in 2065, 7 million less than today (-11%; Istat 
2017).3 The age composition will (is) dramatically change (ing) as well.  
Many advanced countries are experiencing an unprecedented shift in the age composition of 
their populations, a sharp and fast ageing process. Forecasts over the coming decades predict a 
transition from an ageing to an aged society, in particular in Europe and Japan (see UN 
Population Prospects 2017). Italy, as many others developed countries, is facing today a 
demographic scenario whose impact on per capita output growth in the coming decades will be 
negative (Barbiellini Amidei, Gomellini and Piselli 2018). It is much more debated which, if any, 
will be the demographic impact on price dynamics in the long run. 
Figure 1 
Share of elderly (pop> 64 years; %), main industrialized countries, 1900-2016 
  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Our elaborations, data described in the text. 
 
3 Data specifically related to Italy are sourced from Barbiellini Amidei, Gomellini and Piselli (2018) based on 
http://seriestoriche.istat.it/ and http://dati.istat.it/. 
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Focusing on 8 main industrialized countries (Figure 1, left panel: Canada, US, Japan, UK, 
Spain, Germany, France and Italy) the share of population over 64 has increased significantly in 
the long term, dramatically in the new millennium to unprecedented levels.4 In the 1950-2016 
period the 8 countries average share of the elderly more than doubled from 8 to 20%. 
In Japan today more than a quarter of the population is aged over 64, in Italy and Germany 
more than a fifth (Figure 1, right panel). Falling fertility rates and increasing longevity are the 
driving forces underlying such demographic trends. 
According to forecasts, the ageing process will be even stronger in the future and a truly global 
phenomenon (see Broniatowska 2017; Bobeica, Nickel, Sun 2017). 
It is useful to look separately at the two main factors inducing such long-term changes in the 
size and in the age structure of the population: fertility and longevity, as proxied by birth and 
death rates over more than a century. Figures 2-8 provide information about country-wide birth, 
death and natural change of population rates for Italy and the other seven industrialized countries. 
Since Italian unification, birth rates and mortality rates have declined over the course of the 
demographic transition (Figure 2). The progresses in average life expectancy have been 
enormous and will continue in the future: ISTAT estimates that in 2065 life expectancy at birth 
will be 90.2 years for women and 86.1 for men (+5 years compared to 2017).5 
Figure 2 
The demographic transition in Italy and beyond 
Number of live births (in blue) and deaths (in red) per thousand inhabitants. 
Dotted line: forecasts. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Barbiellini Amidei, Gomellini and Piselli (2018). 
4 Sources of reconstructed demographic historical data: Mitchell (2007a,b,c), Statistics Bureau of Japan (2108), 
Statistics Canada (2017), UN World Population Prospects (2017), World Bank (2018), Eurostat (2018). 
5 Life expectancy in Italy was 29 in 1861 and around 65 in 1961 (Brandolini, Vecchi 2013). 
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The number of births per 1.000 population for the 8 countries was 30 around 1900 and still 
around 20 in mid-1960s thanks to the baby booms experienced after WWII (especially by 
winning countries), but decreased significantly in the subsequent four decades, with the 
completion of the first demographic transition for all of them (Figure 3). The shrinking of the 
birth rate continued in the new millennium, notably in Japan and Italy, down to 10 on average in 
2016.  
 
Figure 3 
Birth and death rates (per 1000 population; crude), main industrialized countries, 
1900-2016 
  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Our elaborations, data described in the text. 
 
The death rate (per 1000 population) in the eight countries considered decreased marginally 
on average in the 1950-2016 period from 11 to 9, after having completed its long run retreat and 
more than halving in the previous fifty years (was 21 on average in 1900). Mainly as a result of 
the substantial ageing process, in recent years for the first time (apart from war years) all 8 
countries experienced a bounce back of the death rate, considerable in Japan.  
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Figure 4 
Rate of natural increase (per 1000), main industrialized countries, 1900-2016 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Our elaborations, data described in the text. 
 
The developments in the birth rate described above, coupled with the death rate evolution, 
resulted in a population natural growth slowing down progressively in past 50 years to reach zero 
on average in 2016. While in recent years the UK, France, the US and Canada still exhibit low 
but positive rate of natural increase (per 1000 population; Figure 4), notably Germany since the 
1970s, Italy since the 1990s and Japan since the 2000s are experiencing a natural decrease of 
population.  
Looking at total population growth, in order to account also for the contribution of net 
migration, the picture changes to some extent: on average, the population of the eight countries 
we scrutinize grew around 1% per annum up to the 1960s, slowed down in the subsequent decade 
to oscillate around 0.5 since early 1980s. In the past 4 decades if all countries experienced a 
population growth slowdown, Germany, Japan and Italy underperformed with almost nil. 
Entering in the new millennium Japan’s population is shrinking, German one is still, and Italian 
barely positive only thanks to immigration.6 
  
6 Looking at countries historical experiences, Canada, US and Japan are confirmed as characterized by an higher 
population growth up to the 1960s, followed by Germany; Italy and Spain lost population dynamism as a result of 
emigration; and France is confirmed as laggard but improving significantly its performance thanks to immigrants. 
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Figure 5 
Share of working age population (15-64; %), main industrialized countries, 
 1900-2016 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Our elaborations, data described in the text. 
 
As the share of working age population in total population is a function of young people 
entering the labour force and old people leaving it, the slowdown in total population growth, 
along with the described (lower) fertility and (higher) longevity trends, translated in recent 
decades in a decline of working age population (WAP).  The eight countries’ average share of 
working age population (people aged 15-64) over total population, after increasing from 61% at 
the beginning of the XX century to a pick of 67% in early 1990s, is shrinking in the last 25 years 
(see Figure 5 and 6). Indeed, in recent decades, if only Japan lost 10 percentage points (to a 60% 
WAP in 2016), all countries experienced a retrenching of WAP (below 65% in 2016). What is 
today quite exceptional is that, according to all forecasts, recent widespread worsening trend will 
be maintained by stabilized low fertility rates and higher life expectancy. Looking ahead to the 
next four decades, while for half of our countries the total population will shrink (Japan, 
Germany, Spain and Italy) and for half it will increase only moderately (US, Canada, UK and 
France), for all of them the WAP share will decline further and significantly, falling below 60% 
(close to 50% for Japan; see UN Population Prospects 2017). In Italy the share of the working age 
population is projected to reach 55 per cent and splitting it by citizenship, in 2061 about a quarter 
will be constituted by foreign citizens (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6 
Share of working age population(15-64; %) 
(Light blue: percentage of foreign citizens. From 2021: Istat forecasts) 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Barbiellini Amidei, Gomellini and Piselli (2018). 
 
To summarize the population age structure evolution and explore its economic consequences, 
we calculated the classical dependency ratios returning the relative proportions of population with 
different economic attributes in respect to consumption and saving behavior, as well as labour 
force participation (Bobeica, Nickel, Sun 2017). 
 
Figure 7 
Structural dependency ratio  
(pop. 0-14 and >64 years on WAP; percentages) 
  
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: main industrialized countries, 1900-2016; Italy, 1861-2061, Istat forecasts. Source: our elaborations on data 
described in the text and Barbiellini Amidei, Gomellini and Piselli (2018). 
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The Structural dependency ratio – i.e. the burden of dependents, both young and old, on 
active population – decreased from 63% at the beginning of the XX century to 49 in 1990 (as 
baby boomers had fewer children than their parents), experienced a reversal in the new 
millennium to reach 55 per cent on average in the eight countries considered in 2016. It is 
projected to rise sensibly for all countries in the next decades (Figure 7). For Italy in particular 
the index of structural dependence is expected to overcome 80% in the next fifty years.  
In fact  the YADR – the ratio of the youth (0-14) over working age population – since early 
1970s decreased sensibly from 40 to 24 on average in 2016 (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8 
Young age and Old age dependency ratios  
(YADR, 0-14; OADR, >64; percentages)  
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: main industrialized countries, 1900-2016. Source: Our elaborations, data described in the text. 
 
The Old Age Dependency Ratio (OADR, the ratio of elderly (65+), over working age 
population) more than tripled on average since 1900. With the new millennium, in a few years, 
the burden of elderly people on active population increased sharply in all countries. A gap has 
opened and will expand: according to forecasts, while the YADR should stabilize, the OADR 
should keep increasing for a wide set of countries. 
The notable changes in the population age structure that industrialized countries experienced 
in the past 70 and will experience in the next 50 years, may have had an impact on economic 
performance. In this paper we investigate the long-term relationship between the demographic 
variables and inflation. 
Here we start with a simple graphical inspection of inflation and a summary measure of the 
demographic structure (Figure 9 and 10). 7  
7 Sources of reconstructed inflation rate historical data: Mitchell (2007a,b,c), Historical Statistics of Japan (2012), de 
Motes (2013), BIS (2018). 
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Figure 9 
CPI inflation rate (%), main industrialized countries, 1900-2016 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Our elaborations, data described in the text. 
 
Notwithstanding a certain degree of heterogeneity in the past 120 years, the average inflation 
rate in our sample dropped from 12.8 in early 1980s to 1.6% in the new millennium (Figure 9), 
showing a common trend across our countries, also shared by several other newly developed and 
developing countries. In particular in recent years attention was drawn to a more marked decline 
towards historically low inflation levels in ageing countries (see Juselius and Takáts 2018; 
Broniatowska 2017). 
In Figure 10 over the 1950-2016 period we plot the change in the share of the working age 
population together with the inflation rate for four industrial countries (of the 8 we showed so far: 
they all display similar profiles). At a first glance in the long term there seems to be a positive 
correlation between inflation and the change in the working-age population share. While this 
movement from high to low inflation is mostly granted to more effective monetary policy, recent 
studies (reviewed in the following section) point to a role for demography too. As this correlation 
between population age structure and inflation may be driven by some common trends and 
factors, in the next sections we will perform a formal econometric analysis for Italy, exploiting 
the sub-national dimension (provinces). 
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Figure 10 
Inflation rate and change in the share of the working age population (%), Japan, 
USA, UK and Italy, 1950-2016 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Our elaborations, data described in the text. 
 
3. Measuring the effect of demography on price dynamics: a review of the literature 
Demographic changes affect many crucial economic aspects. Ageing directly alters the 
relative size of the labor force, with important impacts on production, consumption-saving 
decisions, productivity and other related variables. The transmission channels are manifold, and 
often with offsetting effects (e.g. Carvalho et al. 2016). The demographic structure has also been 
lately invoked as possibly affecting price dynamics. The issue is policy-relevant, since the 
ongoing ageing process will substantially alter the age structure of the population in years to 
come. 
In this paragraph we review the literature which examines the link between demography and 
inflation. We focus in particular on those studies which are similar to the present work in terms of 
aims and methodologies, and that empirically estimate the inflation-demography relationship. 
Existing works use different methodologies and investigate both the short run (works based on 
panel data cross-country analysis) and the long run (papers which use cointegration techniques). 
The latter approach is consistent with the idea that demography has a slow moving trend: in the 
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words of Bobeica et al. (2017), “any impact that demographics may have on inflation is unlikely 
to occur over the business cycle frequency, but rather at a generational frequency”8.  
It is worth noting that none of the extant empirical studies try to identify which are the 
underlying mechanisms driving the relationship between demography and inflation. Nonetheless, 
it is useful to briefly sketch some potential channels at work. 
 These mechanisms may have a “quantitative” origin (e.g. a reduction in the share of 
working-age population which entails ceteris paribus a reduction in labour supply and an increase 
of dependents), or a “behavioral” origin, operating through incentives and agents’ preferences 
(e.g. the expectation of a longer life lead people who are in their working age to save more). Both 
can determine different consumption-saving patterns and demand-supply discrepancies affecting 
inflation. 
 According to life-cycle consumption-saving models (see Ando and Modigliani 1963), the 
increase in the average age of the population entails more households using accumulated savings 
to finance future consumption. Being the latter not backed by new production, this can fuel a gap 
between demand and supply (see Broniatowska 2017). Thus, more dependents (both young and 
old) could theoretically exert an inflationary pressure through excess demand: they consume 
more goods and services than they produce (inflation-augmenting demand-supply discrepancy). 
On the costs side, if ceteris paribus the share of working age people decreases, labor supply 
shrinks and wages can be pushed up contributing to fuel inflation. 
Consumption patterns are likely to change as populations age9. Elderly people could exhibit 
lower consumption along their residual life, thus an ageing population can lead to a reduction in 
aggregate demand and to a lower inflation (excess supply). This mechanism can be reinforced: 
feeding expectations of an economic slowdown, it may in addition cause a reduction in 
8 In this approach the proportionality between money growth and inflation in the long run, is often addressed by 
controlling for monetary policy variables (interest rates or money growth; we use both in our analyses). The 
underlying idea is that the fraction of the inflation's long-run variation explained by long-run money growth although 
being very high and relatively stable, could vary over different periods and in different countries. This is shown, for 
example, by Benati (2009), who investigates how shocks to velocity of circulation and inflationary outbursts affected 
the relationship over time: “ .... For long periods of time, the long-run component of inflation has moved less than 
one-for-one with the long-run component of money growth…”, in particular, “…following  the  disinflation of the 
early 1980s the correlation dropped below one…” (pp. 5-6).  
9 Hobijn and Lagakos (2003), Börsch-Supan (2003), van Ewijk and Volkerink (2012), Lührmann (2005, 2008), 
presents cross-sectional overviews of consumption-age profiles of several different expenditure groups for the U.S., 
Germany, the Netherlands, and UK. Groneck and Kaufmann (2017) review some micro studies on the United States 
and the European countries, which detect an age pattern in consumption data. 
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investments (Shirakawa 2011)10. Differently, looking at the composition of their consumption 
basket, elderly cohorts mainly shift their consumption habits from tradeable to non-tradeable 
goods and services which may exhibit higher price dynamics11. 
Finally, on the behavioral side, according to the secular stagnation hypothesis (put forth by 
Hansen 1938, and recently revived by Summers 2014), the increase in life expectancy raises 
propensity to save and this provides an additional mechanism through which demographic 
changes affect inflation (cfr. Carvalho, Ferrero, Nechio 2016). In particular a structural excess of 
savings over investment reduces the real interest rate causing the economy to operate below 
potential and possibly contributing to keep inflation subdued12.  
Turning to empirical studies, they reach heterogeneous conclusions about the impact of 
demographic changes on inflation, although the result of a negative relationship between price 
dynamics and ageing seems to prevail (see Table 1).  
Lindh and Malmberg (2000) in a panel data analysis, estimated the relationship between 
inflation and age structure on annual OECD data for the period 1960–1994 for 20 countries. 
According to their results, an increase in the proportion of net savers (i.e. working age 
population), dampens inflation, whereas retirees, especially younger ones, fuel inflation as they 
consume out of accumulated savings (pension claims) and do not produce.  
In the same vein Juselius and Takáts (2015, 2016) show that the age-structure of the 
population is a systematic driver of price dynamics. Using panel data for 22 advanced economies 
over the 1955–2010 period, they find that a larger share of dependents (both young and old) is 
10 Shirakawa (2011), quotes Keynes (1937; who actually referred to a population decrease rather than a change in the 
age structure): “in an era of a declining population, …demand tends to be below what was expected and a state of 
over-supply is less easily corrected. Thus a pessimistic atmosphere may ensue”. 
11 Older people tend to reduce their expenses on tradable goods (like transportation, furniture, home electronics and 
clothing), while demand for nontradeables (such as housing and health care goods and services) increases. Groneck 
and Kaufmann (2017) estimate for US in 2011 that the share of aggregate nontradable consumption of the older 
people (aged 65+) is on average about eight percentage points higher than in the case of the younger people (aged 
15-64). Nerlich and Schroth (2018) focusing on the euro area show that population ageing entails changes in relative 
prices, mainly shifting demand, with demand for services rising. 
12 Some authors adopt a political economy perspective: an ageing population may contribute to low rates of inflation 
since a greater share of (older) people asks for lower inflation (which otherwise would hit their accumulated wealth). 
Bullard et al. (2012) adopt this perspective suggesting that an aged population structure (like that prevailing in Japan) 
may contribute to observed low rates of inflation or even deflation. They argue that monetary policy could be 
influenced by the inflationary preferences of dominant voter groups, therefore, when the elderly are the dominant 
group in a society, their tendency to prefer lower inflation rates may lead to the appearance of deflationary pressures 
Other authors refer to a further mechanism based on the to the so-called Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) 
which could have implications for the relationship between demography and prices (Woodford 1995, Katagiri 2014). 
According to FTPL the current price level adjusts to equate the real value of the government’s outstanding debt, with 
the discounted sum of current and future fiscal surpluses in real terms. Population ageing is a factor expected to 
reduce future fiscal surpluses due to higher social security expenditures and lower income tax revenues. Thus, in 
order for the FTPL to hold, one would expect ageing to generate inflationary pressures (that is, an upward pressure 
on current prices) which would lower the real value of outstanding debt. 
14 
 
                                                          
correlated with higher inflation, whereas more working age population leads to lower inflation. 
According to their research, overall demographic changes accounted for one third of the variation 
in inflation for the countries they studied in the analyzed period. However, using a finer age 
structure, they find that the old population has an ambiguous sign: the effect is positive for most 
old cohorts except for the 80+ cohort, for which it is significantly negative. Thus, they argue, the 
deflationary effects of ageing found in previous studies could be primarily driven by the very old 
cohort (which, interestingly, will increase rapidly in the coming years). More recently the same 
authors  extended the time span of their analysis to 1870-2016 confirming their early results 
(Juselius and Takáts, and 2018): an increase in the share of the dependant population is generally 
associated with higher inflation, 80+ people excluded, whereas an increase in the working age 
population has the opposite effect.  
Other studies find that ageing has a deflationary impact. Yoon et al. (2014) show that 
population ageing has an economically and statistically significant impact on key macroeconomic 
variables. In particular, using a panel dataset covering 30 OECD economies for the period 1960-
2013, they find that (conditional on country-specific population growth) the ageing process 
dampens inflation significantly. Anderson et al. (2014), using the IMF Global Integrated Fiscal 
and Monetary Model (a general equilibrium macro model), find deflationary pressures from 
ageing, stemming mainly from the declining GDP growth and the fall in land prices13. 
Using a sample of 34 OECD countries over 1970-2013, Gajewski (2015) shows that ageing 
exerts downward pressures on prices. The old-age dependency ratio coefficients (in a regression 
where inflation is the dependent variable) have signs supporting the deflationary effect of ageing 
(although they lose statistical significance in the FE model after robust SEs are calculated). 
According to their results, a one percentage point increase in the share of the population aged +80 
translates roughly into a one percentage point decline in the average inflation rate, a significant 
reaction if we think about the projected rapid increase in the +80 population share in the future. 
Broniatowska (2017) investigates whether inflation is linked to the population age structure, 
and in particular whether the old-age dependency ratio  (OADR) is correlated with a lower 
inflation rate. To check this hypothesis, a panel data model is estimated for 32 OECD economies 
over the period from 1971 to 2015.  The paper shows that an higher old-age dependency ratio is 
indeed correlated with lower inflation and thus ongoing population ageing may exert downward 
pressure on inflation. 
13 They also add a mechanism based on the repatriation of foreign assets by the elderly which leads to a real 
exchange rate appreciation, exerting a downward pressure on inflation, as result of an increased demand for 
relatively cheaper foreign goods and services. 
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According to Bobeica et al. (2017) demographics is a slow-moving process unlikely to 
influence inflation at the business cycle frequency. So, they perform a co-integration analysis to 
study the long-run relationship between demographic changes and inflation dynamics for the 
period 1975-2016 for the euro area. They present evidence in favor of a positive relationship 
between core inflation rate (stripped out of the energy and food components) and the growth rate 
of working-age population. Thus, a diminishing working age population (which is nowadays the 
other side of the coin of a higher share of the elderly), comes hand in hand with fading 
inflationary pressures. They also find that the relationship is mitigated by the effect of monetary 
policy, which they account for by including the short-term interest rate in the analysis14.  
Katagiri et al. (2014), using OLG model-based simulations, argue that it is not ageing per se 
that causes deflationary or inflationary pressures. In their paper, they show that potentially the 
direction in which population ageing affects the inflation rate depends on the origins of the 
process. Ageing can be deflationary when caused by increased life expectancy, as is the case in 
the recent past and it will be, according to demographers, in the next decades. Differently, 
population ageing stemming from a decline in birth rates generates inflation15. All in all, they 
show that over the past 40 years ageing caused a yearly deflation of about 0.6 percentage points 
in Japan. 
Finally, Liu and Westelius (2016) exploit demographic and economic variation in panel data at 
the prefectural level in Japan between 1990 and 2007 and find that prefectures that aged at a 
faster pace experienced lower overall inflation. The approach we follow in the next paragraphs is 
characterized by the use of data at the provincial level for Italy, in the same vein of Liu and 
Westelius (2016).  
4. Data and estimation methods 
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
The dataset we have built for our econometric analysis assemble data on prices and 
demographic variables at the provincial capital level for Italy for the period 1982-2016. 
14 “As already pointed out in the literature, but not formally addressed, demographics is a slow-moving process, 
unlikely to influence inflation at the business cycle frequency. For this reason, we focus on long-term relationships 
between the two variables by employing a co-integration framework. We find supporting evidence for a positive 
relation between inflation and the growth of working age population in total population. A diminishing growth rate 
of the working age population, which can occur due to a higher share of the elderly, comes hand in hand with fading 
inflationary pressures.” Bobeica et al. (2017), p. 8. 
15 They refer to the political economy approach and to the FTPL theory described above: when ageing is due to a 
decrease in birth rates, it shrinks the future tax base and raises future fiscal expenditure thus fueling inflation via 
FTPL. On the other hand, ageing could be deflationary when caused by an increase in longevity since the higher 
share of elderly people prefers lower inflation and exerts political pressures for this purpose. 
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We collected census and annual data on population, its age structure and various 
demographic variables at sub-national level. Annual data on resident population, births, deaths, 
marriages, registrations and cancellations (from/for abroad and other municipalities) for Italian 
capital provinces are sourced from Istat (the National Institute of Statistics) publications 
Popolazione e movimento anagrafico dei comuni, Annuario di statistiche demografiche and 
Annuario Statistico italiano from 1949 to 2016. Data on population by age and municipality are 
sourced:  at decennial frequency at the Census years, from 1951 to 2011 from Istat Censimenti 
della Popolazione; at annual frequency since 1982 to 2016, from Istat inter-census annual 
reconstructions (Ricostruzione intercensuaria della popolazione per età e sesso al 1 gennaio – 
anni vari) and current demographic statistics repositories (Popolazione residente comunale per 
sesso, anno di nascita e stato civile).  
We collected monthly data on price indexes at sub-national level since 1947 to date, 
mainly from Istat (1984), which reconstructs historical sub-national price indexes, since 1861 
Italian unification16. The consumer price index we consider is the general cost of living index 
(indice del costo della vita per famiglie di operai e impiegati, FOI). We collected data for 99 
province capitals, but as they were not always available in the time period 1982-2016 considered 
in our estimation exercises, we selected 74 provincial capital indexes17. Indexes series are re-
based to 1995=100 and spliced.  
Data on monetary aggregate M2 are drawn from Barbiellini Amidei et al. (2016), while 
data on monetary policy rate are drawn from the Bank of Italy’s website,Historical statistics 
section, for the period up to 1998 and the ECB website for the period 1999 to present. Data on 
GDP are sourced from Baffigi (2013; updated). 
In the current analysis we use annual data from 1982 to 2016, since we firstly focus on the 
role of age structure and annual data by age and capital province are available only from 1982 on. 
Table 2 reports main descriptive statistics of the dataset used in the econometric analysis, a 
balanced panel of 74 capital provinces for 34 years. 
Demographic variables and inflation across provincial capitals over the 1982-2016 period are 
displayed in Figures 11-13.  
16 In particular: data are sourced for 1947 to 1983 from Istat (1984); data for the period 1984-1994 are unpublished 
and kindly provided by Istat; since 1995, data were downloaded from Istat website. For price indexes Istat uses the 
adjective “provincial”, but the reference is always to prices surveyed in the provincial capital city. 
17 For our 74 provinces, we replaced missing data by linear interpolation up to 2-in-a-row missing years and when the 
final level of index was available; otherwise we used the dynamics of the closest city in the same region. 
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Although provincial capitals broadly share similar demographic patterns over time, 
heterogeneity of demographic variables is considerable across provinces. Old age dependency 
ratios increase significantly on average and the trend is positive in all the provinces, and even so, 
the overall increase in Cagliari (in Southern Italy: +180% from 1982 to 2016) is much higher 
than in Reggio Emilia (in Northern Italy: +25%). OADR ranges from a minimum of 13% in 
Brindisi in the South to a maximum of 34% in Trieste in the North at the beginning of the 1980s 
and from a minimum of 29% in Napoli in the South and a maximum of 48 in Northern province 
of Savona in 2016. OADR dispersion across provinces remained significant and stable over time, 
as well as within the three Italian geographical regions (except for an increased dispersion among 
Southern provinces). Finally, the difference between North-Center Italy and Southern provinces 
kept significant: an OADR equal to 23% viz a viz 16% at the beginning of the period; 41% viz a 
viz 34% in 2016.  
The dynamics of working age population share (q1564) is more uniform across cities, but still 
the negative trend emerging since the beginning of 1990s in Italy is much steeper in the Northern 
cities (a drop by over 10% in Venezia, Aosta, Genova and Ferrara in the North) than in the 
Southern ones, where in some cases even reversed (Palermo +4%, but also positive in the other 
main Southern capital provinces Naples, Reggio Calabria, Sassari, Brindisi, Catania and 
Siracusa). At the beginning of the 1980s, the working age population share is at the lowest level 
in Palermo (64%) and at the maximum 69% in Modena in the North; 35 years later the minimum 
is 60 % in Savona and the maximum 67 in Sassari. WAP share dispersion across provinces was 
than lower (in respect to OADR) and quite stable nationally (increasing slightly only among 
Northern provinces), and not too dissimilar in the three Italian geographical regions. 
While sharing a common downward trend over the 1982-2016 period, a substantial variance 
also emerge with reference to inflation across provincial capitals (yet lower than for demographic 
variables). Inflation rates decreased dramatically on average and in all the provinces, passing 
from 16% on average in 1982, to 0,03% in 2016. Inflation dispersion across all provinces 
decreased significantly over time, as well as in the three Italian geographical regions. The 
difference between North-Center Italy provinces and Southern ones was not significant neither at 
the beginning and the end of the period, neither on average. Yet while in 1982 were registered at 
the provincial level inflation rates in a min max range of 13-18%, in 2016 provincial capitals 
inflation rates still differed widely in a -0.5-2% range.  
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Figure 11 
Demographic variables and their territorial variability  
(ratios; percentages)  
Old age dependency ratio Young age depencency ratio 
  
Working age population share (q1564)  
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Our elaborations, data described in the text.  
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Figure 12 
Dependency ratio and its territorial variability  
(ratios; percentages)  
Dependency ratio across Italian provinces Dependency ratio across: Northen Italy provinces 
  
Dependency ratio across: Centre Italy provinces: Dependency ratio across: Southern Italy provinces 
  
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Our elaborations, data described in the text. 
  
Italian average 
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Figure 13 
Inflation across provinces, 1982-2016 
(percentages)  
Inflation rate across Italian provinces Inflation rate across: Northen Italy provinces 
  
Inflation rate across: Centre Italy provinces: Inflation rate across: Southern Italy provinces 
  
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Our elaborations, data described in the text. 
 
4.2 Empirical strategy  
Unlike the most part of the existing literature, in order to assess the impact of demography on 
inflation we adopt a within-country perspective (rather than a cross country one), using the 
provincial capital inflation rates as dependent variable, to analyze the relative dynamics of local 
prices compared to national average. In this way we take into account more effectively the effect 
of monetary policy – which is, allegedly, the main driver of price dynamics over the medium-to-
long run – and of the business cycle. Furthermore, the within-country approach allows us to wipe 
out the effects of supranational shocks which can have different impacts across countries and 
which are more homogeneous in a single country.  
 
Italian average 
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We estimate the following equation:  
𝜋𝜋p,t =𝛼𝛼1 Dp,𝑡𝑡+𝛼𝛼2Δ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝p,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼3𝜋𝜋p,𝑡𝑡−1+𝛾𝛾p+𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+𝑢𝑢p,𝑡𝑡  
where the annual inflation for province p, at time 𝑡𝑡 (our dependent variable) is denoted as 𝜋𝜋p,𝑡𝑡. 
The variable D is our explanatory demographic variable of interest, which in turn will be the 
Working Age Population (the population share aged >14 and <65), the Dependency Ratio (𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅, 
the share of people aged <15 and >64 over the working age population), the Old Age Dependency 
Ratio (OADR, the share of people aged >64 over the working age population), the Young Age 
Dependency Ratio (YADR, the share of people aged <15 over the working age population). 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 
is the provincial population (Δ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 is the yearly rate of change)18. 
We start by performing a standard pooled OLS and panel estimates with γp  representing 
province fixed effects and, δ𝑡𝑡 representing time fixed effects. Time fixed effect accounts for any 
time-varying common factor as, firstly, monetary policy and national business cycle, and 
secondly common external shocks. In some specifications we include the lagged inflation rate, 
𝜋𝜋p,𝑡𝑡−1 to capture the high degree of inflation persistence, in these cases we perform Arellano-Bond 
(1991) estimates to account for possible endogeneity and for bias in the dynamic specification of 
inflation (Nickell-bias)19.  
We then extend our econometric analysis in order to explore the long-run relationships between 
demographics and inflation and we estimate a cointegrated panel. As previously said, 
demography has a slow moving trend and is likely to have an impact on inflation mostly at lower 
frequencies. In order to explore the role of demography as a possible structural driver of inflation 
at low-frequency, we use an Error Correction Model in a panel cointegration approach20. This 
approach also stands out as the most appropriate when the time dimension of the panel (t) is close 
to the cross-section one (p), and there is also evidence that the variables are not stationary over 
time21. If inflation and a set of variables are non-stationary but co-integrated (for each single 
province), then this relationship can be reparametrized in an error-correction form: 
18 Liu and Westelius (2016), in their cross-provincial analysis for Japan (limited to the 1990-2007 period), estimate 
the contribution on inflation of the shares of working age population (15-24, 25-44, 45-64) together with OADR. 
Feyrer (2007) first came out with this specification based on working age population shares in order to assess the 
impact of demography on productivity, using a large panel of countries. 
19 Another possible approach to deal with endogeneity when the time series dimension is of sufficient length is using 
a panel VAR setting (e.g. Ferrero et al. 2019). 
20 Breitung and Candelon (2006) show that a significant error correction term in a time domain specification amounts 
to a significant contribution of the low (zero) frequency to the dynamics of the variable of interest. 
21 It is in fact well assessed that with the increase of time observations in panel, non-stationarity can be a concern. 
First of all, the presence of unit roots in the variables can make the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator perform poorly 
(Roodman 2009). Second, standard inference for estimated coefficient can be incorrect (Entorf 1997). 
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 Δ𝜋𝜋p,t = -𝛼𝛼1 (𝜋𝜋p,t -β1 Dp,𝑡𝑡- β2𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝p,𝑡𝑡 -β3 ∆M2/GDP𝑡𝑡)𝑡𝑡-1+ 𝛼𝛼2 ΔDp,𝑡𝑡-1+  𝛼𝛼3Δ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝p,𝑡𝑡-1+ 𝛼𝛼 4 ∆∆M2/GDP𝑡𝑡-1 +εp,𝑡𝑡  
where β1 - β3  are the long-run parameters (elasticities) and 𝛼𝛼1 is the error-correcting speed of 
adjustment term. We include in each equation a macrovariable ∆M2/GDP, the ratio between 
Money (M2) and GDP in real terms as a proxy of the impact of monetary policy on inflation via a 
quantitative-equation channel22, gauging also for the level of economic activity. If 𝛼𝛼1 = 0, then 
there would be no evidence for a long-run relationship. This latter parameter is expected to be 
significantly negative under the prior assumption that the variables show a return to a long-run 
equilibrium.  
We firstly use the mean group estimator (MG) proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995), where 
the intercepts, slope coefficients, and error variances are all allowed to differ across provinces23. 
In this specification each equation is estimated individually, a common time effect cannot be 
included and parameters are estimated as an average of individual coefficients24.  
To control for endogeneity25 of right-hand variables in the long-run, we also estimate the 
cointegration relationship using another mean-group panel estimator: the dynamic OLS (DOLS) 
estimator (Pedroni, 2001), which controls for the endogenous feedback effects by augmenting the 
cointegrating regression with lead and lagged differences of the regressors.  
 
5. Econometric analysis: results 
5.1 Panel estimates 
Table 3 shows the set of pooled OLS and panel estimates for each relevant demographic 
variable. As dependent variable we use the annual inflation (infl) of each single province capital.  
22 Using a standard quantitative equation M·V=P·GDP, the well-known relationship between money, velocity of 
circulation, prices, real gross domestic product, for stable velocity of circulation, the following relationship (in 
growth rates) holds ΔP= ΔM-ΔGDP= Δ(M/GDP). This equation underlies for instance the quantitative reference 
value for the growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate in the ECB’ first pillar monetary policy strategy. In the 
ECB formulation, however, the reference money aggregate is M3 (ECB 1999; Ferrero et al. 2011), while we use M2, 
the main reference aggregate of Italian monetary policy before the advent of euro (Barbiellini et al .2016), which not 
surprisingly turns out to be the most correlated with inflation (with respect to M1 and M3) in the whole period under 
scrutiny. 
23 Not constraining long-run elasticities to be equal across all panels, it makes the estimator consistent both in the 
hypothesis of slope homogeneity and in the case of heterogeneous slopes. 
24 We tried also by pre-transforming variables in differences from annual average, but this makes our inflation 
variable stationary, while long-run cointegration analysis lies on a set of non-stationary variables (see Pedroni 2001 
on the impossibility of including a time effects in cointegrated panels). 
25 As Pesaran and Smith (1995) assume that regressors are exogenous, our estimation of the long-run relationship is 
likely to be biased. 
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For each demographic explanatory variable we present: pooled OLS, panel with province and 
time fixed effects, Instrumental Variable (IV) based on Arellano-Bond technique (AB) 26.  
As regards our demographic explanatory variables the results are the following (Table 3): 
a. The dependency ratio (DR) is significantly negatively correlated with inflation (ranging 
from -0.025 in FE2 fixed effects estimate to -0.061 in Arellano Bond-GMM estimates)27.  
b. The old age dependency ratio (OADR) is negative and significant in OLS and FE1 
(province fixed effects); turns out to be not significant when considering time fixed 
effects and using the AB estimator.  
c. The young age dependency ratio (YADR) is positive and significant in OLS and FE1 
(province fixed effects), turning negative introducing time fixed effects in FE2 and in AB. 
d. The share of working age population (q1564) is positive and significant in OLS and in 
both FE estimates (0.057 in FE2), but not significant in AB estimates.  
Additionally, common features across all the estimates are the following: OLS and panel 
estimates are always statistically equivalent; all the models do not reject the hypothesis that fixed 
effects are equal to a unique constant term (F-test: FE=0) and the fixed-effects turns out to be 
almost always orthogonal to the regressors (corr~0); inflation turns out to be quite persistent 
with a significant positive autoregressive component. 
All in all, this short-term analysis returning results not adequately robust – while in line with 
the expected negative impact of ageing process on inflation – suggests the idea that demography 
affects inflation at lower frequencies rather than having an year-on-year impact. Thus, we 
perform a cointegration analysis in order to sort out a possible long-run relationship. 
  
5.2 Cointegration estimates 
To explore the long-run relationship between demographics and inflation, thanks to the long-
time span covered by our panel data we now perform a cointegration analysis.  
Thus, firstly, we analyze the long-run properties of our series by running some stationary tests.  
A set of standard unit root tests for panel data actually confirm that the inflation (linfl), 
dependency ratio (ldr), the old age dependency ratio (loadr) and the working age population 
26 Unfortunately, lagged variables fail to be a good instrument since they are not orthogonal to the errors and do not 
have enough explanatory power of the contemporary variables; the construction of better external instruments for our 
demographic ratios is still in progress. 
27 Ferrero et al. (2019) yield a similar coefficient on this demographic variable (-0.07) in a panel VAR setting for the 
Euro area countries. 
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share (lq1564) are not stationary; the evidence is weaker for population (lpop) and the young age 
dependency ratio (yadr) (Table 4) 28. Additionally, all the series exhibit high level of persistence. 
The test for unit root is also accepted for M2/GDP growth variable.  
In the presence of non-stationary data, we search a cointegration relationship among inflation 
and each demographic variable. In this specification, we include the monetary policy M2/GDP 
variable. 
 Cointegration tests (Table 5) suggest that our variables are cointegrated (the null hyphotesis 
of no cointegration is generally strongly rejected, except for weaker evidence for oadr).  
Hence, we firstly perform Mean Group (MG) estimates (Table 6). Then we run DOLS 
estimates (Table 7), in order to correct for endogeneity in the long-run coefficients29. Inflation is 
the dependent variable. Along with our demographic variables, we introduce as additional control 
variables – along with population – the change in the ratio M2/GDP in order to account for the 
monetary nature of inflation in the long run, according to quantitative theory of money, gauging 
also for the level of economic activity30.  
When we correct long-run coefficients for the endogeneity bias using DOLS estimates, we 
obtain (Table 7):  
a. a robust negative relationship between inflation and the dependency ratio (ldr; -2.4) 
b. a negative contribution of the old age dependency ratio (loadr; -2.0)  
c. a negative coefficient for the young age dependency ratio, amid an only weakly 
cointegrated relationship between inflation and this demographic variable (lyadr; -0.6);  
d. the share of working age population (lq1564) has a positive effect on inflation (6.6). 
Finally, the sign of monetary variable (dlM2/GDP) results positive. 
28 All the variables in this section are log-transformed. To manage some negative values for inflation (infl) expressed 
in percentage points, in some provincial capitals in recent crisis years, we applied the following transformation: 
linfl=log(infl+1).  
29 To test for exogeneity of demographic variables, we run an error-correction specification where the demographic 
variable is the dependent variable, in the vein of Canning and Pedroni (2006) and Bronzini and Piselli (2009). 
Although the ECM and the short-term coefficients of inflation are significant, the coefficients are very small (close to 
zero) with respect to the others in the long as well as in the short run. Hence, if any, endogeneity of demographic 
variables is not a big issue in our estimates. 
30 We also used the monetary policy interest rate obtaining similar results. Moreover, we performed Mean Group 
Estimates with time effects (Pedroni 2011), obtaining results for our demographic variables similar to those with 
monetary variables. However, as emphasized by Pedroni himself, including time effects could “destroy” (in his 
words) the cointegration relationship, making some variable stationary (as in our case it appears to happen to the 
inflation variable). 
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In MG estimates, long-run elasticities for our demographic explanatory variables exhibit 
mostly the same sign and similar magnitude as in Pedroni’s (with the exception of yard).31   
According to DOLS estimates, the negative relationship between the inflation rate and the 
dependency ratio implies that in the long run a 1 per cent increase in the DR determines a 2.4 per 
cent decrease in inflation32. This would suggest that in the period 1982-2014, when average 
inflation in Italy dropped 16 percentage points from 16.2 to 0.3%, the increase (from 49.8 to 
58.2%) of the dependency ratio might have been responsible for more than one-third of the 
overall decrease in inflation, a magnitude in line with other author’s findings33. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Some studies have recently examined the long-term relationship between the changes in the 
demographic structure and price dynamics mainly carrying out cross-country empirical analyses 
and reaching heterogeneous results. 
This paper started by documenting demography and inflation dynamics since the beginning of 
the twentieth century for Italy in international comparison, and then showed how the evolution of 
the demographic structure has influenced the dynamics of prices using annual data for a panel of 
Italian provinces along four decades since early 1980s. The within-country approach we adopt 
wipes out problems of cross-country analysis, related to the effects of different national monetary 
policies – main drivers of price dynamics in the medium term. It also allows results to be less 
distorted by unidentified supranational or nation-specific economic shocks. 
In order to measure how changes in prices have been influenced by changes in the 
demographic structure, the latter measured by a set of ratios (dependency, old age, young age, 
working age population), both panel estimates (with year and province fixed effects) and 
cointegration estimates are used. Cointegration analysis allowed us to look at the long-term 
relationship between demographic change and inflation, following the idea that demography has 
31 Table 6 reports also short-term coefficients of lagged differenced variable (D_). In the MG estimation, without a 
correction for endogeneity, the sign of dlM2/GDP turns negative in the long run, showing both signs in the short-run, 
often not significant.  
32 We refer to the dependency ratio since DR combines and summarizes the overall underlying changes in the 
demographic structure.  
33 In particular, according to Juselius and Takats (2016, p. 9), the age structure effects capture a large part of trend 
inflation (with a negative sign for working age population): “The estimated age-structure effect […] explains the 
low-frequency evolution of inflation well, not only on average, but even in individual countries […]. The effect is 
also large: it accounts, on average, for around five percentage point reduction in the rate of inflation from the late 
1970s to the early 2000s. That is, it explains around half of the total average reduction in inflation from its peak”.  
26 
 
                                                          
a slow moving trend and is likely to impact inflation mostly at low frequencies. The results 
obtained, while showing that short-term effects of demographic factors are not entirely robust, 
imply that the deep changes in the demographic structure would have contributed to dampen 
price dynamics in the long term. 
As in Bobeica et al (2017, p.21), “this paper did not aim to shed light on the various 
mechanisms through which demographics impact inflation”, but the reduced-form evidence we 
produced “supports theories that point to a net deflationary impact of demographic change”. 
From 1982 to date, average inflation in Italy fell by 16 percentage points from 16.2 to 0.3% per 
year, while the dependency ratio, which summarizes the overall change in the age structure, 
increased from 49.8 to 58.2%. Based on our estimates, demographic change gave a significant 
contribution to the observed decrease in the rate of inflation. Given the prevailing demographic 
trends, these results suggest that demography may also contribute in the next future to keep 
aggregate price dynamics subdued. 
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Table 1 
Empirical studies about the impact of demographic changes on inflation 
Authors Title Methodology Unit of 
observation 
Period Demograpic explanatory 
variables 
Effect of ageing on inflation 
Lindh and 
Malberg (2000) 
Can age structure forecast 
inflation trends? Panel data analysis 20 Countries 1960-1994 Share > 65  Positive 
Juselius and 
Takats (2016) 
The age-structure–inflation 
puzzle Panel data analysis 22 advanced economies 1955-2014 Dependency ratio Positive 
Bullard et al 
(2012) 
Demographics, Redistribution, 
and 
Optimal Inflation 
OLG-based 
simulations - - 
Young age and 
Elderly shares   Negative 
Yoon et al 
(2014)* 
Impact of Demographic 
Changes on Inflation  Panel data analysis 30 Countries Japan 1960-2013 
 
Share > 65 
 
Negative 
 
Anderson et al 
(2014) 
Is Japan’s Population Aging 
Deflationary? GIMF model- based  simulations Japan 1991-2001         Elderly share Negative 
Gajewsky 
(2015) 
Is ageing deflationary? Some 
evidence from OECD 
countries 
Panel data analysis 34 OECD Countries 1970-2013 Old Age  Dependency ratio, OADR Negative 
Broniatowska 
(2017) 
Population Ageing and 
Inflation Panel data analysis 32 OECD Countries 1971-2016 OADR Negative 
Bobeica (2017) Demographics and inflation Cointegrated VAR Euro Area 1975-2016 Working Age Pop Negative 
Liu and 
Westelius 
(2016) 
The Impact of Demographics 
on Productivity and Inflation  
in Japan 
Panel data Japan Prefectures 1990-2007 OADR Negative 
Katagiri (2014) Aging and Deflation from a Fiscal Perspective 
OLG-based 
simulations Japan 1970-2010 
- Higher Longevity 
 
- Lower Birth rate 
Negative 
 
Positive 
Doug et al 
(2016) 
Demography and Inflation:   
An International Study 
Panel data analysis 
VAR model 22 countries OECD 
1955-2010 (sub-
periods) Full age-structure Mixed (periods and methodology) 
Ferrero, Gross 
and Neri (2019) 
On secular stagnation and    
low interest rates: 
Demography matters 
Panel VAR Euro Area 1990-2015 Dependency ratio Negative 
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive statistics  
(1982-2016; units and percentages)  
  
Inflation 
 
 
Dependency 
ratio 
 
Old age 
dependency 
ratio 
Young age 
dependency 
ratio 
Working 
age pop.         
(share) 
Population 
growth 
rate 
 
(Infl) (dr) (oadr) (yadr) (q1564) (dppop) 
Obs 2590 2590 2590 2590 2590 2516 
Mean 4.1 50.3 30.1 20.2 66.6 -0.2 
Stand. Dev. 3.7 6.3 7.9 4.6 2.7 1.0 
Min -0.6 36.9 12.6 12.2 59.5 -10.9 
Max 18.4 68.1 48.7 43.5 73.0 8.6 
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Table 3 
Panel estimates, 1982-2016 
(Dependent variable: inflation) 
 
Variables OLS FE1 FE2 IV-AB OLS FE1 FE2  IV-AB  OLS FE1 FE2  IV-AB  OLS FE1 FE2  IV-AB  
Inflation (t-1) .745*** .737*** .221*** -.097*** .729*** .67*** .232*** .225*** .761*** .749*** .215*** .214*** .745*** .737*** .221*** .213*** 
Pop. Growth -.094*** -.068*** -.041*** -.04** -.138*** -.062*** -.063*** -.061*** -.175*** -.219*** -.033** -0.027 -.093*** -.068*** -.04*** -0.028 
DR -.036*** -.047*** -.025*** -.061***             
OADR   
  
-.032*** -.081*** -0.0057 0.031   
  
  
  YADR   
  
  
  
.014** .032*** -.037*** -.033***   
  Q1564   
  
  
  
  
  
.081*** .106*** .057*** 0.09 
Const 2.38*** 2.96*** 1.51***  1.61*** 3.37*** 0.247  .211* -0.096 .76***  -4.84*** -6.44*** -3.57***  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Obs 2516 2516 2516 2442 2516 2516 2516 2442 2516 2516 2516 2442 2516 2516 2516 2442 
R2 0.86 0.861 0.962  0.861 0.866 0.961  0.857 0.857 0.962  0.86 0.861 0.962  
F-test (αi=0)   0.204 1.57     1.39 1.41     0.207 1.72     0.274 1.57   
Corr (X,αi=0)  -0.023 0.0037 
 
 -0.121 0.012 
 
 -0.021 -0.012 
 
 -0.023 0.0038 
 
                 
Prov FE  X X X  X X X  X X X  X X X 
Time  FE   X X   X X   X X   X X 
                                  
Notes: FE1: estimates with province fixed effects; FE2: estimates with province and time fixed effects; IV-AB Arellano-Bond’s(1991). Difference GMM; Robust estimates; 
Robust s.e.; *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 4 
 
 
Unit roots tests 
(data in levels log-transformed; 1982-2016) 
 
Unit root test Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
    
Variable INFL POP DR 
Levin-Lin-Chu (1) -6.38 0.00 -11.40 0.00 -5.41 0.00 
Im-Pesaran-Shin (1) 0.96 0.83 -2.39 0.01 3.06 0.99 
Breitung (1) 9.49 1.00 -4.72 0.00 3.63 0.99 
Hadri LM test (2)  53.03 0.00 50.74 0.00 53.27 0.00 
     
Variable OADR YADR 
 
Q1564 
Levin-Lin-Chu (1) -13.93 0.00 -23.57 0.00 -3.91 0.00 
Im-Pesaran-Shin (1) -1.09 0.14 -19.03 0.00 4.16 1.00 
Breitung (1) 3.59 0.99 -10.35 0.00 3.45 1.00 
Hadri LM test (2)  62.14 0.00 32.08 0.00 53.81 0.00 
       
Notes:(1) H0: Panel contains a unit root/H1: Panel is stationary; (2) H0: Panel is stationary; H1: 
Panel contains a unit root. 
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Table 5 
 
Cointegration tests 
(Tests of cointegration between log levels of inflation, population, M2/gdp growth  
and the corresponding demographic variables) 
 
Test Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
     
 DR OADR 
Gt -2.44 0.03 -2.58 0.00 
Ga -7.32 1.00 -9.03 0.99 
Pt -17.97 0.08 -20.06 0.00 
Pa -7.68 0.38 -10.72 0.00 
 
YADR Q1564 
 
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Gt -2.60 0.00 -2.47 0.01 
Ga -5.87 1.00 -7.42 1.00 
Pt -17.03 0.31 -18.06 0.07 
Pa -6.39 0.91 -7.78 0.33 
     
Notes: Results for H0: no cointegration. Ga, Gt: group mean 
estimator; Pa, Pt: panel estimator. See Westerlund (2007) and 
Westerlund and Persyn (2008). 
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Table 6 
Mean-Group estimates  
(Error correction model under cointegration. Log-transformed variables 
Dependent variable: inflation; 1982-2016) 
 
 Expl. variables Coef. z p-value   
Coef. z p-value 
Long-run     
Long-run    lpop -4.65 -0.80 0.42  lpop -10.11 -0.87 0.38dlM2/GDP -5.10 -3.43 0.00  dlM2/GDP -7.24 -2.53 0.01 ldr -2.44 -2.53 0.01  lyadr 1.29 1.59 0.11 Short-run     Short-run    L.ecm  -0.42 -20.30 0.00  L.ecm -0.37 -17.95 0.00 d.ldr -4.70 -4.87 0.00  d.ldr -2.18 -2.82 0.01 d.dlM2/GDP 0.06 0.21 0.84  d.dlM2/GDP 0.38 1.72 0.09 d.lpop -3.60 -2.09 0.04  d.lpop -6.21 -3.50 0.00 L.d.ldr -3.79 -3.59 0.00  L.d.lyadr -1.53 -1.58 0.11 L.d.dlM2/GDP -1.59 -7.23 0.00  L.d.dlM2/GDP -1.37 -8.35 0.00 L.d.lpop -1.91 -1.62 0.11  L.d.lpop -3.56 -2.50 0.01 Const 45.68 5.03 0.00  Const 46.89 3.82 0.00 
         Long-run     
Long-run    lpop 7.21 0.50 0.62  lpop -8.33 -3.51 0.00dlM2/GDP -5.89 -2.86 0.00  dlM2/GDP -3.87 -3.48 0.00 loadr -1.74 -1.25 0.21  lq1564 8.32 3.34 0.00 Short-run     Short-run    L.ecm  -0.48 -20.46 0.00  L.ecm -0.42 -20.32 0.00 d.loadr -2.60 -4.29 0.00  d.lq1564 11.60 4.03 0.00 d.dlM2/GDP 0.31 1.08 0.28  d.dlM2/GDP -0.26 -1.10 0.27 d.lpop -4.05 -2.66 0.01  d.lpop -3.29 -5.11 0.00 L.d.loadr -0.64 -1.18 0.24  L.d.lq1564 14.90 4.61 0.00 L.d.dlM2/GDP -1.47 -6.79 0.00  L.d.dlM2/GDP -1.74 -9.19 0.00 L.d.lpop -0.62 -0.61 0.54  L.d.lpop -1.81 -1.41 0.16 Const 56.09 5.27 0.00  Const 33.92 3.27 0.00           Notes: Mean Group estimator by Pesaran and Smith (1995): the intercepts, slope and error variances are all allowed 
to differ across groups. The long-run cointegrating vector is normalized on inflation with a coefficient of -1 (not in 
table). Error-correction terms (ecm) enter the equation as lagged variables (L.); the other short-term variables are 
differenced (d.). 
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Table 7 
 
Panel dynamic OLS  
(Cointegration vectors. Log-transformed variables. Dependent variable: inflation; 1982-2016) 
 
Equation Coef t-stat 
lpop -.19 0.538 
dlM2/GDP 3.94 15.48 
ldr -2.41 -22.91 
   lpop 1.97 7.61 
dlM2/GDP 2.65 12.44 
loadr -1.98 -24.18 
   lpop -.54 0.740 
dlM2/GDP 6.21 20.52 
lyadr -0.64 -4.64 
   lpop 0.18 1.88 
dlM2/GDP 3.80 15.22 
lq1564 6.63 20.84 
   
Notes: Pedroni's (2001) group mean Panel 
Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares estimates. 
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